iPGaze

Research ยท August 2026

Email Authentication Across the Top 10,000 Domains (August 2026)

We queried the DNS of 10,000 of the web's most-linked domains and checked six things: SPF, DMARC, the DMARC policy actually in force, MTA-STS, BIMI and DNSSEC. 8,471 of them (84.7%) publish an MX record and therefore run email. Among those, publishing a record is close to universal โ€” but 29.4% of DMARC records are set to p=none, which monitors spoofing without ever blocking it.

publish SPF
95.2%
publish DMARC
86.4%
of those never enforce
29.4%
sign DNS with DNSSEC
12.4%

Percentages are of the 8,471 domains that publish an MX record, unless stated otherwise.

Adoption is nearly universal

SPF and DMARC record adoption among mail-carrying domains
  • Publishes an SPF record95.2% (8,068)
  • Publishes a DMARC record86.4% (7,315)
  • Requests DMARC aggregate reports (rua=)87.9% (6,427)

The aggregate-report share is of the 7,315 DMARC records, not of all mail domains.

Among domains that actually run email, 95.2% publish SPF and 86.4% publish DMARC. That is the result of sustained pressure from mailbox providers, capped by Gmail and Yahoo's 2024 requirement that bulk senders authenticate. At this tier, having the records is table stakes.

Counting all 10,000 domains โ€” including the 1,529 with no MX at all, such as CDN endpoints, link shorteners and parked brand domains โ€” the figures fall to 84.3% for SPF and 76.3% for DMARC. Those domains send no mail, but they can still be forged in the From: header, so publishing a null SPF and a p=reject DMARC record on them is a cheap win most owners skip.

The enforcement gap

A DMARC record is only as strong as its policy. p=none monitors and reports; it instructs receivers to do nothing. Only p=quarantine and p=reject actually stop a forged message. Here is how the 7,315 DMARC records split:

DMARC policy distribution
  • p=reject โ€” forged mail is rejected42.1% (3,080)
  • p=quarantine โ€” forged mail goes to spam28.4% (2,081)
  • p=none โ€” monitor only, blocks nothing29.4% (2,151)

Percentages are of the 7,315 DMARC records found.

Nearly three in ten DMARC adopters โ€” 2,151 domains โ€” are still at p=none. The intended path is to start there, collect aggregate reports, confirm every legitimate stream passes with alignment, then move up. 87.9% do request reports, so the monitoring step is working. The step after it is where domains stall.

Add the 13.6% of mail domains with no DMARC record at all, and roughly four in ten domains that run email remain open to exact-domain spoofing โ€” the technique behind most phishing and business-email-compromise attacks.

SPF: most records do not actually fail

SPF failure qualifier among mail-carrying domains
  • -all โ€” hard fail44.7% (3,787)
  • ~all โ€” soft fail (accept, mark as suspicious)45.1% (3,822)

The mechanism at the end of an SPF record decides what happens to mail from an unlisted server. Only 44.7% of mail domains end theirs with -all; 45.1% use ~all, which asks receivers to accept the message anyway. In practice DMARC alignment matters more than the SPF qualifier โ€” but a record ending in ~all with a p=none DMARC policy provides no protection at all.

Transport and brand: the long tail

DNSSEC, BIMI and MTA-STS adoption among mail-carrying domains
  • DNSSEC-signed zone12.4% (1,049)
  • BIMI record published11.2% (949)
  • MTA-STS policy published4.3% (367)

Beyond SPF and DMARC, adoption collapses. Only 12.4% of mail-carrying domains sign their zone with DNSSEC, which is what stops an attacker tampering with the MX lookup itself. Just 4.3% publish an MTA-STS policy to force TLS on inbound mail. BIMI, the newest of the three and the only one with a visible payoff โ€” a brand logo in the inbox โ€” is at 11.2%.

Who runs the mail

Inferred from the lowest-preference MX host of each of the 8,471 mail domains:

Mail providers by share of mail-carrying domains
  • Google Workspace31.2% (2,640)
  • Other / self-hosted30.7% (2,603)
  • Microsoft 36522.6% (1,918)
  • Proofpoint7.7% (650)
  • Mimecast3% (252)
  • Tencent Exmail1.7% (141)
  • Zoho0.6% (55)
  • Cloudflare0.5% (39)

Two providers handle more than half of these domains between them. That concentration is why a policy change at Google or Microsoft moves the whole ecosystem โ€” and why the 2024 bulk-sender rules shifted adoption as fast as they did.

Check your own domain

Methodology

On 2026-08-08 we took the top 10,000 domains from the Majestic Million list โ€” ranked by the number of distinct referring subnets, so it reflects how widely a domain is linked rather than raw traffic โ€” and issued six DNS-over-HTTPS queries per domain against a validating resolver.

A domain counts as having SPF if a root TXT record begins v=spf1, and DMARC if a v=DMARC1 record exists at _dmarc.<domain>, with the policy read from its p= tag. MTA-STS and BIMI are read from _mta-sts.<domain> and default._bimi.<domain>. DNSSEC is the resolver's authenticated-data flag on the domain's SOA. Mail provider is inferred from the lowest-preference MX hostname.

Queries that failed were retried with backoff and recorded as unknown rather than absent, so a transient resolver error can never be counted as a missing record. All 10,000 domains resolved. Because this sample is drawn from heavily-linked, well-resourced domains it represents a best case; adoption across the wider web is lower.

One figure we deliberately do not publish is the share of SPF records exceeding the ten-lookup limit. Counting mechanisms in the published record only sees direct ones, while the real limit is evaluated recursively through every include: and redirect=. Measuring it honestly needs a full recursive pass, so we left it out rather than print a number that would read far too low.

These figures are free to cite or reproduce with attribution and a link to this page. Data collected ; we re-run the scan periodically and update the numbers in place.